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PROBLEMS CREATED BY MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
OF SPECIAL DISTRICT TERRITORY
The mass emigration in recent decades from central cities to surrounding
suburbs has created problems that demand solution if either city or sub-
urban area government is to meet the needs created by population growth
and shift. A major problem of suburban areas has been the proliferation of
small local governmental units incapable of providing necessary services on
an area-wide basis when significant economies can be achieved by doing so.'
Possibly the most feasible solution to this problem, and one of the most-
used,2 is the creation of special-purpose districts. The special district, pos-
sesses an autonomous fiscal and administrative structure, and has jurisdic-
tion over a defined territory in which it provides one or more governmental
services. It has authority to own and operate facilities necessary to provide
these services. The district either receives operating funds from the state or
has power to raise revenue by taxation, assessment, or a charge for the serv-
ices rendered.4 The feature of special districts that makes them effective in
meeting the area-wide need for services is that they can straddle the hap-
hazard patchwork of suburban municipal boundaries and can administer
services throughout the entire area where they are needed. '
Unlike special districts, cities, towns, and villages have broadly defined
authority, conferred by state statute, constitution, or legislatively granted
charter, to provide, within their territories, a wide range of governmental
services. These services are the same as those characteristically provided in
suburban areas by special districts. For this reason, large central cities do
not have the suburban problems arising from the lack of efficient, unified
administration of services. They do suffer from another major problem: a
general exodus of middle-class residents, commercial enterprises, and indus-
try from the cities has resulted in a reduction of the more affluent portion of
their tax bases without correspondingly reducing the demand for govern-
mental services. Suburbanites commute to the cities for work and recrea-
tion, adding to the demands made by the cities' own populations, which,
despite the exodus to the suburbs, have not decreased their demands for
1. J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6-11
(1957).
2. See generally M. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO TUE
METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS 3-11 (1962).
3. The term "special district" will be used hereinafter to refer to districts of all
kinds, including school districts, but not including metropolitan districts.
4. 5. BOLLENS, supra note 1, at 1; M. POCK, supra note 2, at 10-11.
5. 3. BOLLENS, supra note 1, at 25-27.
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services. Municipal annexation of more affluent suburban areas may be the
only practicable method of regaining lost tax revenues.' There is evidence
that annexation is, in fact, being used with increasing frequency.'
The situation existing in many urban areas is, then, that two potentially
conflicting processes are at work simultaneously: the creation of special dis-
tricts in suburban areas as a means for meeting the needs of these areas,
and the annexation of adjacent suburban territory by cities in an effort to
meet the cities' needs. Annexation may have the effect of detaching the
annexed area from the district's control and may vest in the city title to a
part of the district's property. This may reduce the district's capacity to
function effectively in the portion of its territory that remains unannexed.
The interests of the annexing city are advanced at the expense of those of
the constituents of the unannexed portion of the district. This conflict of
interests focuses attention on the legal problems arising out of such annex-
ations. This note reviews the law controlling the solution of the most im-
portant of these problems and attempts a limited assessment of the extent to
which the legal rules represent a practical accommodation of the needs
which brought about the creation of special districts. The major legal prob-
lems raised by municipal annexation of special district territory will be con-
sidered in the following order:' Does a municipality have the power to
annex territory that lies within a special district? If so, does the annexing
municipality displace the authority of the district? And if it does, what
arrangements are to be made for disposition of the district's property, the
discharge of its indebtedness, and the performance of its contractual duties?
I. AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO
ANNEX TERRITORY OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS
Both municipalities and special districts are municipal corporations; both
are usually created by state legislatures. State legislatures have plenary
6. See Note, Stumbling Giants-A Path to Progress through Metropolitan Annexation,
39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 57 (1963); Note, Municipal Annexation: Florida's Continuing
Problem, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 129 (1964). See also F. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLU-
TION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 4-6 (1960). But see J. BOLLENS, supra note
1, at 54, 101, suggesting that annexation has not, in fact, been effective in alleviating
urban problems.
7. Note, Stumbling Giants-A Path to Progress through Metropolitan Annexation,
39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 57 (1963).
8. See D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 337-38 (1963),
where Professor Mandelker raises the major problems discussed in this note. Other
problems of realignment of powers and adjustment of liabilities and assets among munici-
palities will arise if there is a merger of municipal governments, irrespective of whether
one of the merging municipalities lies within a district. These problems of municipal
merger may often parallel those arising from the annexation of a district's territory,
but they are not discussed in this note.
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power, within broad constitutional limits,9 to create, abolish, and alter the
boundaries of municipal corporations." Therefore, it is within the power of
state legislatures to solve, by statute, the problems discussed in this note."
Annexation is governed almost entirely by state statutes 2 that provide
procedures by which a municipality may annex adjacent unincorporated
land or may consolidate with an adjacent municipality. The most common
method for annexing land requires a petition signed by a specified percent-
age of the inhabitants of the territory to be annexed. The petition is sub-
mitted to the municipality's legislative body, and the annexation is effected
by the act of this body, usually subject to a ratifying election in the area to
be annexed. 3 A few states provide that a court or administrative body
alone acts on the petition.' 4 Under another procedure, the municipality
passes an annexation ordinance without prior petition. The ordinance
before it becomes effective must usually be ratified by an election in the
annexed area or be approved by a court or administrative body.'
In the absence of specific statutory provision, the courts have unanimously
held that these general annexation statutes empower a municipality to ex-
tend its boundaries to include territory lying within a special district, regard-
less of whether or not such an extension would have the effect of displacing
the district's authority to function in the annexed territory. 6 They have
9. These consist of requirements that taxation must be uniform, limits on municipal
indebtedness, ceilings on tax rates assessable on property, and prohibitions of laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts. These limitations will be discussed below in relation
to the adjustment of indebtedness, contractual obligations, and property of the district
upon its annexation to a municipality. The point here is that these limitations are
narrowly defined exceptions to, and represent no fundamental defect in, state legislatures'
plenary power to change boundaries and re-allocate powers and liabilities among munici-
pal corporations.
10. See Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92
U.S. 307 (1875); State v. Kansas City, 169 Kan. 702, 720-21, 222 P.2d 714, 729
(1950) (dictum); Starmount Co. v. Town of Hamilton Lakes, 205 N.C. 514, 171
S.E. 909 (1933); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.03 (3d rev. ed.
1966); ef. State ex rel. Gibbs v. Couch, 139 Fla. 353, 190 So. 723 (1939).
11. Fairview Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Anchorage, 368 P.2d 540 (Alas.),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 5 (1962); In re Sanitary Bd. of East Fruitvale Sanitary
Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457, 111 P. 368, 370 (1910); Deneen v. Deneen, 293 Ill. 454, 459,
127 N.E. 700, 702 (1920) (dictum); City of Winona v. School Dist. No. 82, 40 Minn.
13, 16, 41 N.W. 539, 540 (1889) (dictum); see City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitary Dist.,
112 Colo. 406, 149 P.2d 662 (1944).
12. See generally Note, supra note 7.
13. Id. at 69-72.
14. Id. at 72-73.
15. Id. at 73-77.
16. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Henry, 184 Cal. 266, 193 P. 502 (1920); City of Pass
Christian v. Town of Long Beach, 157 Miss. 778, 128 So. 554 (1930); State ex rel.
Board of Educ. v. Raine, 2 Ohio C. Dec. 426, 427 (Hamilton County Ct. 1889);
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reasoned that a district, having only limited powers, should not, by its mere
existence on the fringe of a municipality (whose governmental powers are
plenary) fence the latter within its existing boundaries.'"
Moreover, the courts are unlikely to read other related statutes in a way
that would deny or restrict a municipality's general power to annex dis-
trict territory. For example, one case'" involved a statute which prescribed
the consequences of the annexation, by a city having 425,000 or more pop-
ulation, of a levee improvement district's territory. The court stated in dic-
tum that the statute did not by implication deny the power of a city having
less than 425,000 to annex territory which lies within a levee improvement
district. The statute merely failed to prescribe the effects that such an
annexation would have on the district. In another case, " the statute pro-
vided that no territory of a sanitary district could be detached from the
district while it had outstanding bonded indebtedness. This was held not to
preclude an annexation of sanitary district territory when the city assumed
a proportionate share of the district's outstanding bonded indebtedness.
Cases involving statutes that prohibit annexation of the territory of another
municipality hold that special districts are not "municipalities" within the
meaning of such prohibitions."0
Despite these decisions supporting a municipality's power to annex terri-
tory that lies within a special district, the fact that annexed territory lies
within a district may place some limitations or burdens on the exercise of a
municipality's annexation power. For example, it appears that the district
itself, as well as residents of the annexed territory, has standing to contest
annexation on grounds that the requirements of the annexation statute have
not been met."' Statutes in three states deny a municipality the power to
Winship v. City of Corpus Christi, 373 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 646 (1965); Washington Heights Indep. School Dist. v. City of Fort Worth,
251 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Most of the cases cited throughout this note
also support this proposition by implication, since none of the problems discussed here-
inafter could arise unless the municipality has the power to make a valid annexation of
territory lying within a special district.
17. See People ex rel. Cuff v. City of Oakland, 123 Cal. 598, 56 P. 445 (1899);
Tovey v. City of Charleston, 237 S.C. 475, 117 S.E.2d 872 (1961); City of Pelly v.
Harris County Water Control and Imp. Dist., 145 Tex. 443, 198 S.W.2d 450 (1946).
18. City of Irving v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist., 383 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964).
19. Fairfax County v. City of Alexandria, 193 Va. 82, 68 S.E.2d 101 (1951).
20. State ex rel. East Lenoir Sanitary Dist. v. City of Lenoir, 249 N.C. 96, 105
S.E.2d 411 (1958); Tovey v. City of Charleston, 237 S.C. 475, 117 S.E.2d 872 (1961).
21. City and County of Denver v. Miller, 151 Colo. 444, 379 P.2d 169 (1963); In
re Annexation of Sugarloaf Township, 41 Luz. 297 (Pa. Quart. Sess. 1950); see IND.
ANN. STAT. § 28-2346(b) (Supp. 1966). If the grounds for objection are that the
annexation is not advantageous to the district's inhabitants, the district may get short
shrift in court. See Watkins v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 210 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
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annex the real property of school districts.22 And in South Carolina, terri-
tory included entirely within a school district can be annexed only if the
district's board of trustees petitions the municipality and requests annex-
ation.2
3
II. DISPLACEMENT OF SPECIAL DISTRICT'S
AUTHORITY BY ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY
Granted, then, that a municipality is not precluded from exercising its
statutory power to extend its boundaries when the extension would include
the territory of a special district, does this extension have the effect of bring-
ing the territory under the exclusive authority of the municipality for pur-
poses of administering services formerly provided by the district? In the
absence of specific statutory provision, courts have taken various ap-
proaches. Some have relied on rules derived from the common law; others
have attempted to work out practical solutions based on policy considera-
tions; yet others have attempted to divine a legislative intent from statutes
which come close to dealing with the problem but which are not quite con-
trolling. The controlling policy considerations are entirely different when
all, rather than just a portion, of a district's territory is annexed. For this
reason, total and partial annexations will' be given separate consideration.
A. Annexation of Entire District
1. Common Law Rule
If the entire territory of a special district is annexed to a municipality that
has authority to provide the services previously provided by the district, the
common law rule is that, in the absence of any indication of contrary legis-
lative intent, the district dissolves, and the municipality entirely displaces
the district's authority.24 The rationale is that terminating the district's
22. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 35004 (Deering 1963); CoLo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 139-10-1
'1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-1-14 (Smith-Hurd 1967); see MONT. RnV. CODES
ANN. § 11-511 (1957).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-19.1 (1962). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-35 (1962)
(applicable only to Greenville; vote on proposition to annex territory taken separately
in each district).
24. Fairview Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Anchorage, 368 P.2d 540 (Alas.),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 5 (1962); In re Sanitary Bd. of East Fruitvale Sanitary
Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 111 P. 368 (1910); People ex rel. City of Downey v. Downey
County Water Dist., 202 Cal. App. 2d 786, 21 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1962); see City of
Roanoke v. Fisher, 193 Va. 651, 70 S.E.2d 274 (1952); ef. People ex rel. City of Bell-
flower v. Bellflower County Water Dist., 55 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. App. 1966); City
of Escalon v. Escalon Sanitary Dist., 179 Cal. App. 2d 475, 3 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1960).
See also McGurn v. Board of Educ., 133 Ill. 122, 24 N.E. 529 (1890).
The rule has been abolished in California by statute. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 56400
(Deering Supp. 1967).
For an example of circumstances in which the common law rule will yield to an
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authority avoids potential conflict between municipal and district authority,
as well as possible duplication of services.25 It is doubtful, however, that
the potential duplication and conflict are themselves decisive. Rather, the
decisive consideration appears to be that there are no constituents of a
totally absorbed district whose interest in efficient provision of services
should be protected by preserving the district's control and authority." In
cases of partial annexation, the need to protect constituents in unannexed
areas has often prompted holdings that annexation does not result in dis-
placement of the district's authority over the annexed territory.2 This result
is reached despite the possible duplication of services and conflict of author-
ity.
2. Statutory Provisions
Statutes re-allocate district authority following total annexation in three
ways. The simplest and most widely used is an enactment of the common
law rule."8 Under these statutes, the annexed district may retain de facto
powers for certain limited purposes, such as continuing a lawsuit begun
before annexation."
A second method is to grant authority to an administrative body or court
to determine whether the district's authority and functions should be trans-
indication of contrary legislative intent, see In re Paving White Pole, 193 Iowa 423,
187 N.W. 14 (1922).
25. See Fairview Pub. Util. Dist. No. I v. City of Anchorage, 368 P.2d 540, 545
(Alas.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 5 (1962); In re Sanitary Bd. of East Fruitvale
Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 111 P. 368 (1910); People ex rel. Downey v. Downey
County Water Dist., 202 Cal. App. 2d 786, 21 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1962).
26. For a more complete discussion, see notes 42-48 infra and accompanying text.
The district's creditors may, however, suffer a disadvantage if no adequate provisions
are made for discharging the district's indebtedness. This problem will be discussed in
subdivision III infra.
27. See, e.g., Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 141 P. 815 (1914); State v. Inde-
pendent School Dist. No. 6, 46 Iowa 425 (1877) ; State ex rel. Lowe v. Henderson, 145
Mo. 329, 46 S.W. 1076 (1898); see notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
28. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-305 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2786d
(1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3183 (1959); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6411-06 (Supp.
1966); Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 235.240 (1959); NEB. REv. STAT. § 31-763 (1960); N.Y.
GEN. MUNiC. LAW §§ 709(1),(3) (McKinney 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-27-01
(Supp. 1967); OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3311.06 (Page 1960); ORE. REv. STAT. §
222.510 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2-229 (1962); S.D. CODE § 15.2020 (Supp.
1960); Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 974e-8(I) (1963); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §§
35-13.220, -13.247, -61.020 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.023(1) (1965); see
ARxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-1007.02A (Supp. 1966) (volunteer fire companies); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 60.31(1)(a) (1957) (town sanitary district).
29. See Christi v. Harris County Fresh Water Supply Dist., 317 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958).
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ferred to the annexing municipality. Under the California and Wisconsin
statutes,3" the voters of the district are allowed to petition for a public hear-
ig before the decision-making body at which the issue can be debated.
Indiana gives property-owning residents of an annexed school district a role
in the process. Its statutes3" provide that annexation will transfer a school
district's authority and functions to the municipality unless the district or
seventy-five per cent of its property-owning residents appeal to the court.
The court decides on the basis of statutory criteria respecting the soundness
of the annexation as a matter of policy. In other states, when school dis-
tricts subject to the general supervision of a state education authority are
involved, decision-making may be delegated to that authority, with32 or
without33 a provision for initiation of the decision-making process by filing
a petition.3"
Under a third method, the matter is submitted to the voters of the dis-
trict,35 or to the voters or legislative body of the municipality. 0 The Ne-
vada procedure' combines the features of these approaches. It allows prop-
erty owners of the district to block the municipality's governing body from
terminating district authority. A rare provision is that total annexation has
no effect upon the district's functions or powers.38
Some statutes are operative only if the municipality has a specified popu-
lation, 9 or if it is providing the same services as those administered by the
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 56410-56421 (Deering Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 88.83(1)-(3) (Supp. 1967).
31. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-2346 (Supp. 1966), 48-702 (1963).
32. N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAW § 715(2) (McKinney 1965).
33. TEx. Rlv. Crv. STAT. art. 2804a (1965).
34. But see Barrett v. Haas, 62 Dauph. 118 (Pa. C.P. 1951), aff'd, 63 Dauph. 93
(Pa. C.P. 1953), concluding, as a matter of construction, that a similar statute was
applicable only in cases of partial annexation of a district, ipso facto merger with the
municipality being the result of a total annexation.
35. ALASKA STAT. § 42.35.370(a) (1962). But see Fairview Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1
v. City of Anchorage, 368 P.2d 540 (Alas.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 5 (1962),
holding that a statute which provided for a petition election method of dissolving the
district and whose application was not restricted to cases of municipal annexation of
the district was not exclusive; no election was necessary to effect dissolution by ipso
facto merger of the district with the annexing city when the city annexed all of the
district.
36. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 5850-51 (Deering 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-1725b,c (1964); TEx. Rlv. Crv. STAT. arts. 1182c-1(1),(2) (1955), 1182b
(1963), 2804 (1965); WAsr. REv. CODE ANN. § 35-13.243 (1965); WXs. STAT. ANN.
§ 88.83(4) (Supp. 1967).
37. NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 242A.310(1), 242A.250-.290 (1965).
38. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 42, § 447.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
39. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1725be (1964); N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAw § 715(1)
(McKinney 1965); TEx. Rv. Crv. STAT. arts. 974e-8(1), 1182b (1963), 2804a (1965).
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district at the time of annexation."0 Such requirements are designed to
assure that the annexing municipality has the capacity to run the district.
B. Annexation of Part of a District's Territory
1. Common Law Rule
Although some statutes do not differentiate between total and partial
annexation,"' different policy considerations arise in cases of partial annex-
ation. When an entire district is brought within municipal boundaries, and
the municipality can provide the services the district was providing, there is
little reason, aside from protecting the district's creditors, for whom ade-
quate provision can be made, for allowing the district to continue as a dis-
tinct governmental entity. It will usually be expedient to consolidate all
services under the control of the municipal government. A similar argu-
ment has been made when only part of a district was annexed. 2 However,
countervailing considerations arise. The capacity of a district to solve area-
wide problems may depend upon its retaining unified control over its entire
territory. " If part of a district's assets or tax base is taken away, its fiscal
position may be substantially weakened; there may be fixed overhead costs
40. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-305 (Supp. 1965). The requirement most frequently
encountered is that, in cases where a school district is annexed, the municipality must
have its own school district. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2346(a) (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 6411-06 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 715(2) (McKinney 1965);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2-229 (1962); TEX. Rxv. CIv. STAT. art. 2804 (1965); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.023(1) (1965).
41. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-305 (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2346(a)
(Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1725bc (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §
6411-06 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-27-01 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 2-229 (1962); S.D. CODE § 15.2020 (Supp. 1960); TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT.
arts. 2804, 2804a (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.023(1) (1965). A Washington
Statute makes no differentiation if territory containing property which constitutes sixty
per cent or more of the total assessed valuation of property in the district or sixty per
cent of the district's total territory is included in the annexation. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 35.13.243 (1965).
42. See M. PocK, supra note 2, at 33-34. This argument recalls the common law rule
that two municipal corporations cannot exercise authority over the same territory simul-
taneously. The rule is not generally applied when a district, which has only limited
powers, overlaps a municipality possessing full governmental powers. 2 E. McQUILLIN,
supra note 10, § 7.08; M. PocK, supra, at 32. But see In re Sanitary Bd. of East Fruit-
vale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 111 P. 368 (1910).
43. See City of Sacramento v. Southgate Recreation and Park Dist., 230 Cal. App.
2d 916, 919-20, 41 Cal. Rptr. 452, 455 (1964); Fort Wayne Community Schools v.
State ex re. New Haven Public Schools, 240 Ind. 57, 159 N.E.2d 708 (1959); M. PocK,
supra note 2, at 5, 79; note 5 supra and accompanying text; cf. Henshaw v. Forster, 176
Cal. 507, 169 P. 82 (1917); La Mesa Homes Co. v. La Mesa Irr. Dist., 173 Cal. 121, 159
P. 593 (1916); M. PocK, supra, at 34-38. But see Matot v. Inglewood School Dist., 71
Cal. App. 557, 235 P. 667 (1925).
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that are not reduced by diminishing the area in which it must provide serv-
ices.
Especially disastrous results can arise if the district operates a system of
physical facilities, such as a sewer system." City of El Cajon v. Heath" is a
vivid example of the hardship which can result to the residents of the un-
annexed portion of such a district. In that case the defendant was a resi-
dent of a sanitary district that had installed the sewer line serving the de-
fendant's house. The city annexed the land through which the line passed,
but not the defendant's house. The city then sought to enjoin the defend-
ant's use of the line. In denying an injunction, the court pointed out that,
under the principle contended for by the city, if the main trunk line or the
outlet of an entire sewer system were in the annexed territory, the value of
the system to residents of the unannexed territory could be entirely de-
stroyed. 6
While districts that do not operate integral systems of physical facilities-
for example, school or fire districts--may be hurt less by partial detach-
ments of territory, many cases decided in the absence of statutory guidance
hold that such districts retain control over annexed parts of their territory. 47
The same result is reached in many of the cases involving districts that do
have integral systems of physical facilities."' The courts' reasoning seems
usually to be based less on practical considerations as to which body can
more efficiently administer the service than on the belief that a clear indica-
tion of legislative intent is required before a district, specially created to
provide services, can be ousted of part of its territory.
2. Statutes of Tangential Relevance
Consistent with this dependence upon legislative guidance, if there is no
directly applicable statute, the courts often attempt to divine a legislative
intent from statutes not directly in point, rather than relying on judicial
44. See Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 141 P. 815 (1914).
45. 86 Cal. App. 2d 530, 196 P.2d 81 (1948).
46. Id. at 534, 196 P.2d at 83; Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 157-60, 141 P. 815,
817-18 (1914); see F. SENGSTOCK, supra note 6, at 85.
47. City of Sacramento v. Southgate Recreation and Park Dist., 230 Cal. App. 2d
916, 41 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1964); State v. Independent School Dist No. 6, 46 Iowa 425
(1877); see State ex rel. Lowe v. Henderson, 145 Mo. 349, 46 S.W. 1076 (1898).
Contra, Blount v. MacDonald, 18 Ariz. 1, 155 P. 736 (1916); cf. Incorporated Village
of Atlantic Beach v. Kimmel, 25 App. Div. 2d 531, 267 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1966).
48. Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 141 P. 815 (1914); City of El Cajon v. Heath,
86 Cal. App. 2d 530, 196 P.2d 81 (1948); State ex rel. Collins v. Rooney, 361 Mo. 389,
,235 S.W.2d 260 (1950). But see Garden Home Sanitation Dist. v. City and County of
Denver, 116 Colo. 1, 177 P.2d 546 (1947), where the district had not yet installed any
sewerage facilities in the annexed territory.
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precedents or policy considerations. For example, there may be a statute
fixing the district's boundaries as of the date of its creation. Courts have
held that such a statute absolutely establishes the territorial extent of the
district's authority, so that annexation alone does not have the effect of
detaching any territory from the district. 9 This result was reached despite
general declarations in the annexation statutes that annexed territory be-
comes subject to municipal authority, which included power to provide the
same services as the district. On the other hand, courts often hold that the
municipality does displace district authority by emphasizing statutes which
vest authority in the municipality to provide, within its boundaries, the
same services as the district is providing.5" The same result is reached by
emphasizing annexation statutes which provide that annexed territory be-
comes, "for all intents and purposes," part of the municipality.5 There is
49. See Capital City Oil Co. v. Day, 147 La. 734, 85 So. 888 (1920); St. Louis
County Library Dist. v. Hopkins, 375 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1964). In Capital City Oil Co.
v. Day, supra, the statute creating the sanitary district defined the district's territory as
all of the parish south of the City of Baton Rouge. When Baton Rouge extended its
boundaries to the south, only the unannexed part of the district technically satisfied the
statutory description. Nevertheless, the court held that the legislature intended to fix the
district's boundary at the southern boundary of Baton Rouge as it existed at the time
when the statute was enacted, and that, therefore, the annexation did not remove any
territory from the district's jurisdiction.
50. See Cox v. Otay Munic. Water Dist., 200 Cal. App. 2d 672, 19 Cal. Rptr. 595
(1962) (partial displacement of district authority); Washington Heights Indep. School
Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 251 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); cf. Carson v. State,
27 Ind. 465 (1867). But see Harris County Drainage Dist. No. 12 v. City of Houston, 35
S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1931); cf. Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. 507, 169 P. 82 (1917). But
the opposite result was reached under a statute which provided that the municipality
shall not compete with another body lawfully supplying services within the municipality.
City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. and Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 373 P.2d
722 (1962).
51. Vernon School Dist. v. Board of Educ., 125 Cal. 593, 58 P. 175 (1899). Pro-
visions of this tenor are found in the annexation statutes of several states. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 19-306 (1956) (annexed residents entitled to "all rights and privileges" of city
residents; annexed land to be "part and parcel" of city); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 35146,
35210 (Deering 1963) ("a part of the city for all purposes"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
81.100, .110, .195(3) (1963) (annexed land to "become a part" of annexing
municipality); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:179 (1950) (annexed residents to have "all
the rights, immunities, and privileges" of residents of annexing municipality); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 11-507 (1957) (annexed land "shall be, to all intents and purposes,
a part of (the annexing] municipal corporation"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 17-405(3) (1962)
(annexed land "shall be deemed and held a part of' the annexing municipality; annexed
residents "shall thereafter enjoy the privileges and benefits of such annexation"); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:43-29 (1967) (annexed residents "shall have the same rights and be
entitled to the same privileges" as residents of municipality); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
160.453.5(f) (1964) (annexed area "shall be entitled to the same privileges and bene-
fits as other parts of such municipality"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-315 (Supp. 1967)
(annexed residents "shall be entitled to the rights and privileges of citizenship, in ac-
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an even stronger argument for this result if the annexation statute requires
the municipality to furnish services in the annexed territory 2 and these
services happen to be the same ones provided by the district. Likewise, in
the case of partially annexed school districts, the courts may arrive at the
same conclusion by applying statutes declaring that the municipality shall
constitute a single school district." But if a statute provides that an inde-
pendent state or county school authority shall adjust school district boun-
daries, action by such school authority may be held the exclusive method
of detaching territory from a school district, so that annexation alone can-
not accomplish this."
3. Statutory Solutions
There are few comprehensive statutory solutions to this problem. States
having several kinds of districts and several classes of municipalities often
have annexation provisions governing only one kind of district or one class
of municipality. What follows is a brief outline of the ways in which present
statutes resolve the problem of re-allocation of district authority following
partial annexation. The effects of these provisions can be fully appreciated
only within the context of the entire statutory scheme from which they have
been taken. Many of the statutes are found in a complex of provisions
creating and prescribing powers, duties, territorial extent and administrative
cordance with the provisions of the annexing municipality's charter"); TEx. Rzv. Civ.
STAT. arts. 974e, 974e-1(1), 974e-2(1), 974e-3(l), 974e-4(1), 974e-5(1), 974e-6(1),
974e-7(1), 974-1 (1963) (annexed residents "shall be entitled to all the rights and
privileges of other citizens of such city"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1 (1962) (annexed
residents "shall . . . enjoy the privileges of such annexation"); WYo. STAT. ANN. §
15.1-63 (1965) (annexed residents afforded "all the rights, privileges and franchise
services afforded the inhabitants [of the city] including fire protection, sanitary facilities
and utility service").
52. See GA. CODE ANN. § 69-909 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-715(d) (1963);
IowA CODE ANN. § 362.26(6) (Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §2 160-453.3, -453.15
(1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15.1-63 (1962). Other statutes are permissive in allowing
the municipality to determine what services shall be provided to the annexed area.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.70.040, .170 (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 3374-10, -13 (1957)
(municipality's plan for extending services subject to court review for "reasonableness").
53. See Matot v. Inglewood School Dist., 71 Cal. App. 557, 235 P. 667 (1925); City
of Winona v. School Dist. No. 82, 40 Minn. 13, 41 N.W. 539 (1889); Common School
Dist. No. 126 v. City of Fargo, 78 N.D. 583, 51 N.W.2d 364 (1952); cf. State ex rel.
School Dist. No. 1 v. Schriner, 151 Wis. 162, 138 N.W. 633 (1912).
54. See Collins v. City of Detroit, 195 Mich. 330, 161 N.W. 905 (1917); State ex rel.
Board of Educ. v. Raine, 2 Ohio C. Dec. 426 (Hamilton County Ct. 1889); In re
Annexation of Borough of Irwin, 165 Pa. Super. 134, 67 A.2d 765 (1949). But see
Spaulding School Dist. No. 58 v. Waukegan City School Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 351, 164
N.E.2d 63 (1960).
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structure of a district; others are found among the provisions for municipal
annexation.
Although the following is merely an outline of types of provisions ab-
stracted from their statutory context, it is still useful to make a classification
of the types of approaches so that their potential effectiveness in achieving
a workable re-allocation of district authority can be evaluated. Again, a
complete evaluation can be made only with respect to the particular situa-
tion in each state and locality. Because of the wide variety of functions,
sizes, and organizations of districts and municipalities, broad generalization
is of extremely limited value.
The statutory solutions to the problem are of six general types:
a. automatic transfer. The most common type of provision is that annex-
ation of part of a district automatically withdraws the annexed territory from
the jurisdiction of the district and brings it under the annexing municipal-
ity's authority.55 In states having county boards of education with general
statutory authority over all changes of school district boundaries, a question
might arise as to whether such a provision for automatic extension of the
municipal school jurisdiction over annexed territory is in conflict with the
statute vesting authority in the board.5"
While the automatic transfer method has the advantages of simplicity
and predictability, it would appear probable that it will work a hardship on
unannexed constituents of the district in many instances. By substituting an
inflexible rule of automatic transfer for a process of decision-making based
on the facts of each particular annexation situation, these statutes rule out
any possibility that features peculiar to any particular set of facts could be
taken into account.
b. transfer in discretion of annexing municipality. The annexing mu-
nicipality may be empowered to determine, by ordinance, resolution of its
55. ALASKA STAT. § 42.35.390 (1962); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 50-305 (Supp. 1965);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 356c (Smith-Hurd 1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2346(a)
(Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5316 (1964); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 15.3183
(1959); Miss STAT. ANN. § 6411-06 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 321.320 (1959),
162.421 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAW §§ 709(2), 715(1) (McKinney 1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-27-01 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE § 15.2020 (Supp. 1960); TEx.
Rzv. Civ. STAT. art. 2804 (1965); WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 35.61.020 (1965); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.023(1) (1965); see ARxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-1007.01A (Supp.
1967); Louisville and Jefferson County Met. Sewer Dist. v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 353
S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1961); In re City of Gulfport, 253 Miss. 738, 179 So. 2d 3 (1965);
State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 224 Mo. App. 1197, 31 S.W.2d 215 (1930); cf. TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. art. 1182c-5(1) (1963).
56. See City of Beaumont Indep. School Dist. v. Broadus, 182 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944) (county board's authority does not extend to redrawing boundaries after
annexation). This problem has been solved by express statutory provision in Indiana.
See IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2347 (Supp. 1966).
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governing body, or vote of its citizens, whether to displace the authority of
the district in the annexed portion of its territory."
While this method insures that the interests of the municipality are taken
into consideration in each case, it appears unsatisfactory in allowing the
municipality to disregard the interests of unannexed residents of the district.
c. transfer in discretion of district voters. The consent of the district's
voters, given in a special election or at a public meeting, may be required
to effect a transfer of authority over the annexed territory to the municipal-
ity. The vote may be restricted to residents of the annexed portion of the
district's territory or may include all residents of the district." Some of these
statutes parallel statutes providing a procedure whereby residents of the
district may petition for an election at which they can vote to be detached
from the district in the absence of an annexation.59
If the vote is restricted to residents of the annexed area, the interests of
the unannexed residents may be disregarded. The same is true if the vote
is to be taken in the entire district, and the majority required to approve a
transfer of district authority resides in the annexed area. No matter how
the vote is taken, the interests of the municipality in fully integrating the
annexed territory into its system of providing services may be unrepresented.
d. court or administrative decision. Another alternative is to allow the
residents of the annexed area to petition the district's governing body or a
superior state executive authority, such as a state school superintendent, "
or to allow the district or the municipality to petition the superior state ex-
ecutive authority or court"' for a, decision of the issue. The former pro-
cedure is also frequently provided as a means for residents who wish to be
57. CAL. STS. & H'wAys CODE §§ 5852-5853 (Deering 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 72-1725b,c (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 222.524 (1967); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT.
art. 2804 (1965); WAsH. Rv. CoDE ANN. § 35.13.243 (1965); see S.C. CODE ANN. §
47-34 (1962) (applicable only to Greenville-municipal ordinance subject to amendment
and ratification by elections in city and annexed territory).
58. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5316j (1964); Mo. REv. STAT. § 247.170 (1959);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 266.030, 547.755 (1967); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. arts. 7930-3
(1954), 1182a (1963), 2803 (Supp. 1967), construed in City of Van Alestyne v. State,
246 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 1182a (1963)
requires separate majority votes in the annexing municipality and in the territory an-
nexed to effect a detachment from the district.
59. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 56310-56324 (Deering Supp. 1967); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 160.045 (1963); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 7880-76c (1954).
60. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-6-22 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 7-2.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966), construed in Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 122 v. Board
of Educ. of School Dist. No. 205, 63 Ill. App. 2d 196, 211 N.E.2d 482 (1965); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 371.540 (1965); see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-1429 (1963).
61. NEB. REv. STAT. § 31-766 (1960); N.Y. GEN. MUNio. LAw § 715(2) (McKinney
1965).
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excluded from a district to apply for exclusion of their land in the absence
of any annexation."
Under other statutes, the decision-making function is simply delegated to
an administrative body without any petitioning procedure.6 3 In Virginia,
all the terms upon which annexation is to be accomplished are prescribed
by an annexation court; it would appear that the court is empowered to
determine whether the district's authority in an annexed area is to be trans-
ferred to the municipality. 4
This method of decision-making is potentially the best. It allows the
decision to be made by a body with the expertise and impartiality to arrive
at a solution in the best interests of all the bodies and residents concerned.
e. agreement between district and municipality. A fifth kind of provision
requires the municipal government and the district to agree on the re-
allocation of the district's authority over the annexed territory." Some of
these statutes provide that, if agreement is not reached, the district retains
control over the territory.66 Others provide that the municipality automat-
ically assumes control,6 or may, at its option, take controP in default of
agreement. A Nebraska statute " provides for court determination of the
issue in default of agreement.
Since the district will usually be interested in retaining control and the
municipality in displacing the district's authority, it may be expected that
this method will often produce compromise solutions or will result in a
failure of the two bodies to reach an agreement. Compromise may often be
unsatisfactory for all concerned, because it will be the result of bargaining,
rather than of a dispassionate assessment of the long-range best interests of
all bodies and residents concerned. The defects in the procedures men-
62. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-4-3, -4 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-1429
(1963); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.045 (1963).
63. NEV. REV. STAT. § 242A.310 (1965); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3311.06 (Page
1960).
64. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(c) (1964).
65. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2346(c) (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2786e
(1964); Mo. REV. STAT. § 247.160(3) (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. § 31-766 (1960);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-318 (Supp. 1967); TEX. REv. Cv. STAT. arts. 974e-8(i),
1182c-I (2) (1963); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.13.250 (1965); cf. ALA. CODE tit. 52,
§ 83 (1952); ORE. REV. STAT. § 222.530(5) (1967).
66. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2786e (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-318 (Supp.
1967); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. arts. 974e-8(i), 1182c-1(2) (1963); Jefferson County
Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Port Arthur, 327 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.),
rev'g 320 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); cf. ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 83 (1952).
67. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2346(c) (Supp. 1966).
68. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.13.250 (1965).
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 31-766 (1960).
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tioned as alternatives in case of failure to reach agreement have been
pointed out above.
f. no transfer. Finally, some statutes, usually applicable only when a spe-
cified small percentage of the district's territory is annexed, provide that a
partial annexation has no effect, and that the district retains full authority
over the annexed territory."0
Many statutes combine two or more of the above kinds of provisions.
For example, some provide that automatic transfer of authority occurs un-
less there is a contrary agreement. 7' The fact that alternative methods are
provided for a single kind of district indicates the absence of any necessary
correlation between the kind of provision and the nature of the district
involved. The problems suggested by the El Cajon case would lead one to
expect that provisions declaring that no transfer of authority shall occur
would be more likely in the case of districts with integral systems of physical
facilities. Such is not the case, however. Provisions for automatic transfer
of authority are at least as frequently applicable to this type of district as
are provisions that no transfer shall occur.72 Sometimes several kinds of dis-
tricts are lumped together and given the same statutory treatment.73
This absence of correlation is explained, at least in part, by the fact that
many of these statutes do not rely upon the provisions governing the re-
allocation of powers to provide the sole protection for the interests of resi-
dents of the unannexed parts of the district. Rather, they frequently
contain provisions specifically designed to protect these interests. These
provisions vary. Some require that the district's services be continued in the
unannexed portion of the district.74 Examples of other typical protective
provisions include a requirement that annexing part of a fire protection
district shall not result in an increase in insurance rates of unannexed resi-
dents," and a provision that residents of the unannexed portion of a sewer
70. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 42, § 447.1, ch. 1277/2, § 316 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967),
construed in People ex rel. Kelley v. Lund, 25 Ill. 2d 387, 185 N.E.2d 174 (1962);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5316i (1964); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2804a (1965);
WAsH. RE v. CODE ANN. § 35.13.248 (1965).
71. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-2346 (Supp. 1966); Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 2804
(1965); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 35.13.243-.250 (1965). See also notes 66-69
supra and accompanying text.
72. Compare authorities cited note 55 supra, with authorities cited note 70 supra.
73. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-3-1, -3(1) (1963).
74. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-1007.01 (Supp. 1967); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§
35156, 35325 (Deering 1963); N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 709(4) (McKinney 1965);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 222.550, .560 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-318 (Supp. 1967);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 35.13.243(2), .246 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 40.19(1)
(1966). See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 162.421 (Supp. 1967).
75. ORE. REv. STAT. § 222.530(1) (1967).
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district shall continue to have the use of the district's sewer lines after the
municipality acquires control of them."6 Under a Wisconsin statute,"' if
twenty per cent or more of a school district's territory is to be annexed, the
residents of the unannexed portion have the right to compel the municipal-
ity to choose between annexing the entire district or none at all. Mississippi
has a comparable provision, without percentage limitation."'
Unsystematic alteration of the statutory scheme for dealing with the
problem of re-allocation of functions may lead to problems of statutory
construction. For example, a new, comprehensive scheme of special district
government may have been created by statutes which postdate the provi-
sions for transfer of control to an annexing municipality. The courts are
likely to find that the legislature did not intend an unsystematic alteration
of the comprehensively planned district by operation of the provisions for
transfer of control. 9
III. ADJUSTMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN DISTRICT AND ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY
In case the total or partial annexation does result in the municipality's
assuming control over performance of the district's functions, the district's
property must be disposed of, and provision must be made for payment of
its indebtedness and performance of its outstanding contracts. These re-
quirements are imposed at common law and under statutes both to insure
continuation of services to those dependent upon them and to comply with
constitutional limitations.
A. Constitutional Limitations
State and federal constitutional prohibitions against laws impairing the
obligation of contracts may compel state legislatures to make some provision
for discharging a district's indebtedness and performing its outstanding
contracts in case the district's authority, property, and tax base are taken
over by an annexing municipality. This constitutional stricture can often
76. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 80-2022 (1964).
77. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 62.071 (Supp. 1967).
78. MIss. CODE ANN. § 6411-06 (Supp. 1966).
79. See Fort Wayne Community Schools v. State ex rel. New Haven Public Schools,
240 Ind. 57, 159 N.E.2d 708 (1959); Louisville & Jefferson County Met. Sewer Dist.
v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 353 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1961).
80. F. SENOSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROB-
LEM 79-80 (1960); see City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. and Power Dist.,
92 Ariz. 91, 99, 373 P.2d 722, 728 (1962) (dictum); Blount v. MacDonald, 18 Ariz.
1, 155 P. 736 (1916) (dictum); Michigan Trust Co. v. Otero Irr. Dist., 76 Colo. 441,
232 P. 919 (1925) (dictum); Deneen v. Deneen, 293 II. 454, 127 N.E. 700 (1920);
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be avoided, however, by use of the fiction that existing statutes are incor-
porated into contracts, including any statute which allows absorption of all
or part of a district without protections for those contracting with the dis-
trict. This fiction permits the court to say that the statute's operation does
not impair the obligations of such contracts.8 The "obligations of con-
tracts" clause is also circumvented by holding that impairment of contract-
mng parties' rights must be "substantial" before the statute or its application
is unconstitutional.
8 2
Some statutes require the annexing municipality to assume the indebted-
ness of the district. However, a constitutional limit on municipal indebted-
ness may impair such a statute's operation or render it totally unconstitu-
tional if assumption of these debts would cause the municipality to exceed
this limit.8 3 The danger of exceeding such municipal debt limits can be
avoided if the indebtedness is not assumed by the municipality but is paid
by the district instead. Under this plan, the district continues to levy and
collect taxes in the annexed area, though it has no other authority there,
and applies the proceeds to payment of the indebtedness. Since both the
district and municipality tax the annexed area under this arrangement, it
may run afoul of other state constitutional provisions. There may be a
constitutional requirement that taxes be "uniform," or the constitution may
prescribe maximum property tax rates. The objection that the plan violates
the "uniformity" requirement is consistently held to be without merit on
the grounds that this requirement is satisfied if tax rates are set uniformly
throughout the district and throughout the municipality. The accumula-
Board of Educ. of City of Lincoln Park v. Board of Educ. of City of Detroit, 245
Mich. 411, 222 N.W. 763 (1929). But see People ex rel. Raymond Community High
School Dist. No. 158 v. Bartlett, 304 Ill. 283, 136 N.E. 654 (1922) (by implication);
2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.47 (3d rev. ed. 1966).
81. F. SENOSTOCK, supra note 80, at 80; see City of Inglewood v. Los Angeles
County, 207 Cal. 697, 280 P. 360 (1929); Bossert v. Granary Creek Union Drainage
Dist. No. 1, 307 Ill. 425, 138 N.E. 726 (1923); Schewe v. Glenn, 302 Ill. 462, 134 N.E.
809 (1922); Calcasieu Sanitation Serv. v. City of Lake Charles, 118 So. 2d 179 (La.
Ct. App. 1960); cf. Hustead v. Village of Phillips, 131 Neb. 303, 267 N.W. 919 (1936).
82. See School Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lansing, 331 Mich. 523, 50 N.W.2d 150
(1951) (alternative holding); Sechrest v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 2, 331 S.W.2d
679 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (by implication); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 80, § 4.18;
F. S-NOSTOCK, supra note 80, at 80; cf. Brewis v. City of Duluth, 13 F. 334 (C.C.D.
Minn. 1882); Jacksonville Port Auth. v. State, 161 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1964); Metcalf
v. State ex rel. City of Findlay, 49 Ohio St. 586, 31 N.E. 1076 (1892) (by implication).
83. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-3368 (Supp. 1966); Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v. City
of Louisville, 308 Ky. 368, 213 S.W.2d 995 (1948) (dictum). But see Wheeler v. City
of Brownsville, 148 Tex. 61, 220 S.W.2d 457 (1949); 15 E. McQuILLIN, supra note
80, §§ 40.05, 41.43; cf. People ex rel. Downey v. Downey County Water Dist., 202
Cal. App. 2d 786, 21 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1962).
Washington University Open Scholarship
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION OF DISTRICT TERRITORY
tion of two tax levies in the annexed area is not a violation of "uniformity"
so long as both the district and the municipality tax this area at the same
rate as they tax the rest of their respective areas."4 It has also been held
that this does not constitute "double taxation" of the annexed area, in viola-
tion of some state constitutional provisions.8 ' However, the objection that
this plan violates constitutional property tax rate limits has been upheld.
This means that the plan cannot be used if it would result in taxing prop-
erty in the annexed area at a total rate which is in excess of such limit.8 6
B. Methods of Adjustment
1. Total Annexation
No important problems arise when an entire district is annexed and the
effect is simply to merge the district into the municipality. The rule is
uniform at common law"7 and under the statutes: the municipality as-
84. St. Louis County Library Dist. v. Hopkins, 375 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1964);
Kuhlmann v. Drainage Dist. No. 12, 51 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); see 1 T.
COOLEY, TAXATION § 311 (4th ed. 1924); M. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS:
A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 78 (1962). But cf. Kocsis v.
Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935).
85. Kuhlmann v. Drainage Dist., 51 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
86. See State ex rel. Board of Educ. of Columbus v. Dunn, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 102,
165 N.E.2d 247 (C.P. Franklin County 1958); City of Monessen v. Rostraver Town-
ship School Dist., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 364, 39 West. L.J. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1957); M. POCK,
supra note 84, at 73-75. In Michigan, where the voters can change the constitutional
tax rate ceilings, the annexing municipality may condition the effectiveness of its annexa-
tion of school district territory for school purposes and the assumption of indebtedness
of the district on the voters' approval of an increase in the rate ceiling sufficient to
allow the municipality to levy taxes needed to pay the indebtedness assumed. See
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.3433, .3437 (1959).
87. Fairview Pub. Util. Dist. No. I v. City of Anchorage, 368 P.2d 540 (Alas.),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 5 (1962); In re Sanitary Bd. of East Fruitvale Sanitary
Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 11 P. 368 (1910); People ex rel. City of Downey v. Downey
County Water Dist., 220 Cal. App. 2d 539, 33 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1963); People ex rel.
City of Downey v. Downey County Water Dist., 202 Cal. App. 2d 786, 21 Cal. Rptr.
370 (1962); Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176 (1875); City of Roanoke v. Fisher,
193 Va. 651, 70 S.E.2d 274 (1952); F. SENGSTOCK, supra note 80, at 84-85; cf. City
of Escalon v. Escalon Sanitary Dist., 179 Cal. App. 2d 475, 3 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1960);
Bell v. City of New York, 46 App. Div. 195, 61 N.Y.S. 709 (1899). The second (1963)
Downey case and the Escalon case illustrate the court's exercise of alleged "inherent
power" to supervise the adjustment of liabilities and disposition of assets. However,
most courts appear not to recognize such "inherent power"; see note 102 infra and
accompanying text.
88. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-1-18 (Smith-Hurd 1962); ORE. REv. STAT. §
222.510 (1967); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 974e-8(1) (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §
53-4-10 (1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 60.031(1)(a) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-155
(1959); cf. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 40-2011 (1961).
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sumes all liabilities, including bonded indebtedness, of the district and is
entitled to all its assets. The municipality may not, however, be able to
exercise the district's power to levy special assessments to discharge the
indebtedness assumed unless there is a statutory grant of such authority."
2. Partial Annexation.
In the absence of statute, the annexing municipality, of course, neither
acquires title to any property of the district ° nor assumes any share of its
indebtedness9' if the municipality does not displace the district's authority.
When the district's authority is displaced, the common law rules appear to
be as follows:9 2 none of the district's indebtedness is assumed by the munici-
pality, 3 nor does the district's personalty vest in the municipality;"C there
is a division of authority as to whether title to the district's realty that lies
in the annexed area vests in the municipality." The different result reached
by some courts respecting personalty as opposed to realty may be based on
89. See City of Roanoke v. Fisher, 193 Va. 651, 70 S.E.2d 274 (1952). The court
held that the municipality must raise revenue to retire the bonds through its general
taxes. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 60.31(1)(C) (1957) expressly grants the nnexing city
power to continue to collect special assessments levied by an annexed sanitary district,
requiring that the funds be used for the purpose for which the assessment was levied.
90. See City of El Cajon v. Heath, 86 Cal. App. 2d 530, 196 P.2d 81 (1948); State
ex reL East Lenoir Sanitary Dist. v. City of Lenoir, 249 N.C. 96, 105 S.E.2d 411
(1958).
91. See Sanitation Dist. No. 1 v. Louisville & Jefferson County Met. Sewer Dist.,
307 Ky. 422, 208 S.W.2d 751 (1948); cf. Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C. 619, 122 S.E.2d
681 (1961).
92. See F. SEaoSTOCK, supra note 80, at 85-88.
93. See Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92
U.S. 307 (1875) (dictum); Blount v. MacDonald, 18 Ariz. 1, 155 P. 736 (1916);
Board of School Comm'rs v. Center Township, 143 Ind. 391, 42 N.E. 808 (1896); City
of Winona v. School Dist. No. 82, 40 Minn. 13, 41 N.W. 539 (1889); 2 E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 80, § 7.47; cf. Brewis v. City of Duluth, 13 F. 334 (C.C.D. Minn. 1882).
But see City of Pelly v. Harris County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 7, 145 Tex.
443, 198 S.W.2d 450 (1946).
94. See Board of Educ. of Fulton County v. Board of Educ. of College Park, 146
Ga. 776, 95 S.E. 684 (1918) (dictum); School Dist. of City of Saginaw v. School
Dist. No. 6, 231 Mich. 664, 204 N.W. 737 (1925).
95. See Vernon School Dist. v. Board of Educ., 125 Cal. 593, 58 P. 175 (1899);
School Dist. of City of Saginaw v. School Dist. No. 6, 231 Mich. 664, 204 N.W. 737
(1925) (dictum); cf. Board of Educ. of Fulton County v. Board of Educ. of College
Park, 146 Ga. 776, 95 S.E. 684 (1918). But see Reckert v. City of Peru, 60 Ind. 473
(1878); Heizer v. Yohn, 37 Ind. 415 (1871); Board of Educ. of City of Kansas City
v. School Dist. No. 7, 45 Kan. 560, 26 P. 13 (1891); City of Winona v. School Dist.
No. 82, 40 Minn. 13, 41 N.W. 539 (1889); cf. Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood City
School Dist., 156 Cal. 416, 105 P. 122 (1909); Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 41
Ohio St. 680 (1885).
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the theory that personalty has no situs in the annexed area, while realty
does.9" If so, this exposes the inadequate, technical basis of such simplistic,
mechanical rules. They do not take account of vital questions: Which
body can most efficiently utilize the property to serve the most people?
How will loss of the property affect the district's ability to serve its remain-
ing territory? Should the body which controls the property also pay indebt-
edness allocable to it or should indebtedness be divided according to the
proportion of the district's tax base taken over by the municipality? Many
other questions may arise, and the answers must vary depending upon the
size, powers, administrative and fiscal structures of the municipality and
district involved, and upon local peculiarities in the distribution of popula-
tion or terrain features (in the case of flood control, irrigation, sewer and
other similar districts). These are factors which should be taken into ac-
count by legislatures in drafting statutory provisions to govern division of
assets and adjustment of indebtedness. Unfortunately, however, few statutes
deal adequately with these problems.97 Most adopt simple formulae or
delegate authority to the bodies concerned or to some superior tribunal
to work out an adjustment, without detailed instructions.
a. adjustment prescribed by formula. Some statutes simply declare a
definite formula for allocating assets and liabilities between the munici-
pality and district. Thus, the municipality may be required to assume a
part of the district's indebtedness which bears the same ratio to the district's
total indebtedness as the assessed valuation of taxable property in the
annexed part of the district bears to the total assessed valuation of all tax-
able property in the district." A Wyoming statute declares simply that the
municipality shall assume the obligations and acquire the property of the
district, without specifying any ratio for apportionment.99 This may mean
that the municipality acquires all the district's property, or may be designed
to allow the court to exercise discretion in making an equitable apportion-
ment. A Missouri statute 0 assigns the district's assets to the body in whose
territory they are physically located after annexation: the municipality is
entitled to district property located in the annexed portion of the district.
96. See Board of Educ. of Fulton County v. Board of Educ. of College Park, 146 Ga.
776, 95 S.E. 684 (1918).
97. F. SENOSTOCK, supra note 80, at 89.
98. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-3367 (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6411-07 (Supp.
1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 247.170.1(6) (1959); N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 715(4)
(McKinney 1965); ORE. REv. STAT. § 222.520(2)(b) (1967) (bonded indebtedness);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2805 (1965) (bonded indebtedness); F. SENOSTOCK, supra
note 80, at 104; see Board of Educ. v. Ellinger, 244 Mich. 28, 211 N.W. 296 (1928).
99. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-155 (1957).
100. Mo. REv. STAT. § 247.170.1(7) (1959).
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b. adjustment by arbitral tribunal. Some statutes expressly provide for
court or administrative adjudication to make the division of assets and
liabilities, usually without prescribing any ratio as a guide.10' The courts
usually hold that they have no power to make such an adjudication in the
absence of an express statutory grant." 2
c. adjustment by agreement. A frequently used provision requires that
the district and municipality divide up the assets and liabilities of the
district by agreement."0 3 These statutes usually specify the basis of division
as being the assessed valuation ratio mentioned above, and provide for
court or administrative adjudication if agreement cannot be reached. Some
statutes expressly provide that the division of assets may or shall take the
form of a sale or lease by the district to the municipality, and require that
the municipality, notwithstanding payment of the purchase price or rental,
also assume a portion of the district's liabilities. 4
d. eminent domain. A relatively rare method of adjustment is to allow
the annexing municipality to acquire by eminent domain any of the
district's property located within the annexed area.' The condemnation
award would, presumably, allow the district to pay any indebtedness out-
standing on account of the property0 0 and would serve as reimbursement to
the district for loss of its investment. 7
101. ALASKA STAT. § 42.35.370(b) (1962); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3311.06
(Page 1960); S.D. CODE § 15.2022 (Supp. 1960); UTAr CODE ANN. § 53-4-11 (Supp.
1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042(b) (1964). The express statutory provisions are
made for court or administrative adjudication as an alternative to some other method
of adjustment. See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5316e (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. §
31-766(2) (1960).
102. F. SENOSTOCK, supra note 80, at 88. But see Washington Heights Indep. School
Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 251 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 7-1-31, -33 (Smith-Hurd 1962), 7-1-32 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1725(g), -5316(d) (1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 31-766 (1960); ORE. RaV. STAT. § 222.530(1) (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §
6-318 (Supp. 1967); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 1182c-1(2),-5 (1963), 2804 (1965);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.031(2)(b) (1957), 66.03(2)(a),(5) (1965); F. SENOSTOCK,
supra note 80, at 106-07.
Even if there is no express statutory provision, such agreements may be upheld. See
Fuller v. Board of Educ. of City of Peoria, 83 Ill. App. 2d 147, 227 N.E.2d 553 (1967).
104. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2786e(1) (1964); Mo. REV. STAT. § 247.160
(1959); N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAw §§ 709(2), 715(4) (McKinney 1965); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 66.03(2)(a),(3)(b) (1965).
105. See S.D. CODE § 45.0201(108) (Supp. 1960); City of Mesa v. Salt River
Project Agric. Imp. and Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 373 P.2d 722 (1962); Harris County
Drainage Dist. No. 12 v. City of Houston, 35 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1931) (dictum).
106. Louisville & Jefferson County Met. Sewer Dist. v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 353
S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1961).
107. See also notes 117-119 infra and accompanying text.
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e. critique on methods of dividing assets. This last method is clearly in-
adequate, as is that under which property is assigned to the district or
municipality solely on the basis of its location inside or outside of the an-
nexed territory. Less objectionable, because more flexible, are the agree-
ment and adjudication methods. The inadequacy is that these statutes
fail to consider the use of the property. Especially with respect to real
estate, sewer lines, and similar permanent fixtures, ownership or control
should be awarded to the body in whose jurisdiction most of the patrons
who use such facilities reside,' and there should be adequate guarantees
that those who had the use of these facilities before the annexation shall
have the right to continue using them afterwards.' 9 Alternatively, control
should be given to the body which can administer the facilities most eco-
nomically for the greatest benefit of the most people, with the same right
of continued use by those who were using the facilities before annexation.
A statute under which ownership and control is determined solely by
physical location of the facilities can prevent the assignment of facilities
according to most efficient use, and there is no guarantee that the assign-
ment will be made on this basis under the other methods. Efficient use
may not always be the most valid standard for making a division of assets.
The wide variety of purposes, administrative structures, and activities of
districts makes it impossible to state flatly that one single objective will
always have primary importance. But the problem is that the existing
statutes make only sporadic ad hoc attempts to take possible objectives into
consideration.
The statutes, similarly, fail to deal with numerous other problems, many
of which are, indeed, created by their own inexplicit drafting."' For exam-
ple, are assessed but uncollected taxes, or rights to receive state funds, sub-
ject to division between the district and municipality under these statutes?"'
Only a few statutes deal with the problem of whether district funds which
are earmarked for a special purpose, such as construction of facilities, are
subject to division between district and municipality." 2
108. Wisconsin has such provisions. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.03(4) (1965),
60.031(2) (c) (1957).
109. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 222.550 (1965) (by implication). Blanton v. City of
Houston, 350 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) applies the same principle to the
use of proceeds of a district bond issue. Miss. CODE ANN. § 6411-06 (Supp. 1966)
provides that if the annexing municipality takes over a school district's school buildings,
it must annex the entire district upon petition of a majority of unannexed school district
voters.
110. See generally F. SENOSTOCK, supra note 80, at 98-101.
111. See School Dist. of City of Saginaw v. School Dist. No. 6, 231 Mich. 664, 204
N.W. 737 (1925) (right to state funds not subject to statute).
112. See CAL. STS. & H'wAYs CODE § 5853 (Deering 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
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f. special provisions respecting adjustment of indebtedness. It appears
that legislatures have taken more care to anticipate the fiscal problems
arising out of the adjustment of liabilities between district and municipality.
A few of the special provisions made to solve these problems will be re-
viewed here.
Under the first three methods for adjusting assets and liabilities, special
provisions are often made to govern the manner in which indebtedness of
the district is to be retired. In addition, there are often special provisions
prescribing how money is to be raised to make payments which are re-
quired as part of the division of assets. The municipality is usually re-
quired to assume a portion of the district's bonded indebtedness. 13 An
alternative arrangement for discharging such indebtedness is to allow the
district to continue collecting taxes or assessments from residents of the
annexed area until that area's proportionate share of the indebtedness has
been paid."4 The statute may, however, provide that the municipality
shall collect these taxes or assessments and apply them directly to discharging
the debt. 15 Some statutes prescribe how the municipality is to make pay-
ments to retire bonded indebtedness that it has assumed."' Several provide
for making a special assessment to discharge the district's liabilities or to
make the payments required as part of the adjustment of assets.' Others
impose a lien for payment of indebtedness assumed by the municipality on
§ 72-5316(b) (1964). These provisions can avoid problems such as that raised in
Board of Educ. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ellinger, 244 Mich. 28, 221 N.W. 296
(1928). There the annexing municipality claimed a portion of the district's bond issue
funds, although these were earmarked for paying the cost of constructing a new school
for which the contract had already been let. See also People ex rel. Welch v. Dunn,
168 App. Div. 678, 154 N.Y.S. 346, aff'd, 21 N.Y. 688, 112 N.E. 1071 (1916).
113. Miss. Conn ANN. § 6411-07 (Supp. 1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 222.520(2) (b)
(1967); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2805 (1965).
114. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-6-23 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, §
356(c) (Smith-Hurd 1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2715(c), 80-2022 (1964);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3461 (Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 222.520(2) (1967);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7930-3(10) (1954); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
35.13.243(2) (c) (1965). But see Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2803 (1965); People ex rel.
Raymond Community High School Dist. No. 158 v. Bartlett, 304 Ill. 283, 136 N.E.
654 (1922).
Constitutional problems raised by this method have been discussed above. See notes
84-86 supra and accompanying text.
115. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-3366 (Supp. 1966); Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. arts. 1182a(3),
1182c-1(3), -5(3) (1963).
116. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 6411-07 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. GEN. MUNxc. LAW §
709(2) (McKinney 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 222.520 (1967), all requiring the munici-
pality to make yearly payments of installments.
117. S.D. CODE ANN. § 15.2022 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-4-11 (Supp.
1967).
Washington University Open Scholarship
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION OF DISTRICT TERRITORY
the facilities acquired from the district,"' or require special reimbursement
for such facilities to be paid to the district."'
CONCLUSION
Considering the variety and complexity of statutory arrangements, the
need for legislation that comprehensively and systematically works out the
consequences of municipal annexations of special district territory becomes
evident. The present statutes are characteristically scattered throughout
statute books under titles governing municipal annexation or the formation,
functioning and alteration of districts. This indicates that many were en-
acted ad hoc in an attempt to solve particular local problems as they arose."'
Moreover, states which have special districts and also have provisions for
municipal annexations often have no statutes at all particularly dealing
with annexation of district territory. Others have statutes applicable to a
few, but not all, of the several kinds of districts which exist in the state.
118. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.13.249 (1965).
119. See WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.13.243(b) (1965); authorities cited note
104 supra. In the absence of such provision, the courts are likely to hold that no com-
pensation need be paid. See State v. Schriner, 151 Wis. 162, 138 N.W. 633 (1912);
authorities cited note 102 supra.
Professor Sengstock maintains that the annexing municipality should be required to
pay only a proportion of the value of such facilities equal to the proportion of the
district's unannexed territory, population, or property tax base. This is based upon the
right of the inhabitants of the annexed territory to have their investment in the facilities
(the portion of their worth not paid for by the municipality) inure to the benefit of the
municipality, which will use them for the benefit of these inhabitants. F. SENGSTOCK,
supra note 80, at 94-95; cf. School Bd. of Alleghany County v. School Bd. of City of
Covington, 197 Va. 845, 91 S.E.2d 654 (1956).
120. California, Nebraska, Oregon and Washington, however, have combined and
introduced considerable uniformity and system into the district annexation statutes
applicable to several kinds of districts. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 56402, 56410-21
(Deering Supp. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 31-763 to -765 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 222.510-.530 (1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 35.13.220-.250 (1965).
An Idaho statute illustrates a rather simple, yet comprehensive plan which solves
many of the problems discussed in this note:
When the annexed area, or any part thereof, is situated in any district organized
under the laws of this state and supported in whole or part by taxes levied upon
the annexed territory or any part thereof, and said district provides the same or
similar services as that provided by the annexing city to its residents, the annexed
area, shall upon the filing of the certified copy of [the annexation] ordinance be
relieved of all liability for levies, taxes and assessments made by said district after
the calendar year in which said annexation occurred.
The filing of the certified copy of said ordinance shall constitute a withdrawal
of said annexed territory from the district offering the same or similar services to
the annexed territory as the annexing city. . . . IDAHO CODE § 50-305 (Supp.
1965).
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Many of the statutes are quite new, a fact which indicates that the need
for legislative solution of the problems of district annexation is becoming
more urgent as municipal boundaries are adjusted to meet the needs of
rapidly developing urban areas.
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